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Abstract—The advancement of mobile and wireless 
communication technologies in recent years introduced various 
adaptive protocols to adapt the need for secured 
communications. Security is a crucial success factor for any 
communication protocols, especially in mobile environment due 
to its ad hoc behavior. Formal verification plays an important 
role in development and application of safety critical systems. 
Formalized exhausted verification techniques to analyze the 
security and the safety properties of communications protocols 
increase and confirm the protocol confidence. SPIN is a 
powerful model checker that verifies the correctness of 
distributed communication models in a rigorous and automated 
fashion. This short paper proposes a SPIN based formal 
verification approach of a security adaptive protocol suite. The 
protocol suite includes a neighbor discovery mechanism and 
routing protocol. Both parts of the protocol suite are modeled 
into SPIN and exhaustively checked various temporal 
properties which ensure the applicability of the protocol suite in 
real-life applications.  
 
Index Terms—SPIN, AODV, RND, SA-AODV.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A mobile ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile 
nodes that dynamically self-organize into arbitrary and 
temporary network topologies [1]. Due to the ad hoc 
properties of mobile wireless communication the scenario of 
communication has changed dramatically in recent years. In a 
mobile and wireless environment, the network infrastructure 
is not fixed and the network nodes are not only movable and 
their participation is ad hoc. In such a network, the odes can 
randomly move into the network organizing themselves 
arbitrarily and leave it at any point in time. Hence the 
network topology can change rapidly and unpredictably. A 
major constraint in the design of scalable ad hoc networks is 
the mobility of mobile nodes. The realistic movements of 
mobile nodes are captured by mobility models [2]. Mobile 
nodes that are within each other’s range communicate 
directly via wireless links, while those that are far apart rely 
on other nodes to relay messages as routers [3]. Each node 
guides the routing messages according to the routing protocol 
designed for such kind of networks. 
The routes and the flow of the packets in a mobile network 
are decided by an ad hoc routing protocol. The general 
mechanism of ad hoc routing protocols is that, message is 
broadcasted to discover that path from the source and the 
destination node. Data packets are then sent over that path. 
An ad hoc routing protocol could be proactive (table driven), 
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reactive (on demand) or hybrid [4]. Table driven routing 
protocols maintains a table, consisting of routes to the 
destination, at the regular interval of time, by exchanging the 
table information between the nodes periodically. Reactive 
routing protocols on the other hand initiate the route 
discovery only when a node requires a route to the destination 
node, to which the node wants to send the data. That is why 
they are also termed as on-demand routing protocols. 
Examples of reactive routing protocols are AODV, Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR), Temporally Ordered Routing 
Algorithm (TORA), Associativity-Based Routing (ABR), 
Signal Stability Routing (SSR) and many others. Hybrid 
routing protocols are the combination of both the techniques 
used in proactive and reactive routing protocols. The 
technique applied according to the demand of the situation. 
Examples of hybrid routing protocols are Core Extraction 
Distributed ad hoc Routing (CEDAR) protocol, Zone 
Routing Protocol (ZRP) and Zone based Hierarchical Link 
State (ZHLS) routing protocol. 
Numerous approaches have been proposed to analyze the 
security and routing properties of ad hoc protocols. These 
techniques include visual inspection, network simulation, 
analytical proofs, simulatability models, and formal methods 
[5]. Formal method is one of the most reliable ways to 
rigorously check the desired properties of a protocol by 
modeling and analyzing it mathematically. This paper uses 
model checking approach to automatically evaluate the 
safety-critical properties of a security adaptive protocol suite. 
Model checking is an automated technique where first, 
models of both system and properties are created, then the 
model checker checks whether the model satisfies the 
specified properties. Within appropriate constrains, a model 
checker can perform an exhaustive state-space search on a 
software design or implementation and alert the 
implementing organization to potential design deficiencies 
by producing a counter example. In this paper we use SPIN 
model checker [6] where models are specified by using 
PROEMLA language. Our primary aim is to demonstrate 
design flaws that lead to violations of security requirements 
using model checking. Model checkers are good at finding 
design errors and they provide error traces (i.e., 
counter-examples). In our earlier work we developed a 
security adaptive protocol suite [7] that consists of a neighbor 
discovery mechanism and a routine protocol. In this paper we 
model checks the security protocol to find errors in its formal 
specification. 
In the rest of the paper, we give a brief review of our 
security adaptive protocol suite in Section II which is 
followed by an overview of SPIN model checker in Section 
III. Section IV illustrates the proposed framework for formal 
verification of the protocol suite. Finally, Section V 
Verification of A Security Adaptive Protocol Suite Using 
SPIN 
Shamim Ripon, Sumaya Mahbub and K. M. Intiaz-ud-Din 
  
concludes the paper and outlines our future plan. 
II. SECURITY ADAPTIVE PROTOCOL SUITE 
The security adaptive protocol suite is a combination of a 
neighbor discovery mechanism and a protocol. In the 
neighbor discovery phase, the neighbor nodes are ranked 
which is considered the trustworthiness of the nodes. With 
the ranked information collected expressing the trust of the 
neighbors, the routing protocol proceeds. When a demand is 
made from a source to a destination, the source first judges 
the security requirement of the application and then based on 
the ranking information of the neighbor nodes the packet is 
routed to the destination. 
A. Ranked Neighbor Discovery (RND) 
Estimated physical distance between nodes is used for 
ranking neighbors. If a node is physical further away than that 
in routing table, a wormhole is present in the network. The 
idea is to add some information to the packets that restricts 
the maximum allowed transmission distance.  
The nodes are tightly synchronized with a clock and ∆𝑡 is 
the allowed difference between the nodes’ clocks. Temporal 
leashes of a packet is authenticated by using TESLA with 
Instant Key-disclosure (TIK). TESLA combines the 
advantage of digital signature and Message Authentication 
Codes (MAC). TESLA requires that the MAC value of a 
packet is received earlier by the receiver than the time at 
which TESLA key is used to compute the MAC by the 
sender. This can be achieved by sending the MAC value at 
the beginning of the transmission and TESLA key at the end 
of the transmission, shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The receiver checks for the TESLA condition to be 
satisfied, which is that the MAC received before key is 
released and the receiver can start the verification of the 
MAC immediately 
𝑡𝑟 + 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑐 < 𝑡𝑠 − ∆𝑡 + 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑐 + 𝑇𝑝𝑘𝑡. 
After the synchronization of processes it is required to 
measure the distance. The receiver computes an upper bound 
on its distance 𝑑′ to the sender as follows: 
𝑑′ = 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠 − ∆𝑡) [𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  = speed of light] 
Based on the calculated values the sender decides the trust 
values by ranking the neighbors based on predefined range. 
Four (4) types of ranking is used in our protocol suite (shown 
in Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1Rank assignment 
Distance Estimation Rank (R) 
𝑑′ ≤ 𝑇/4 4 
𝑇/4 < 𝑑′ ≤ 𝑇/2 3 
𝑇/2 < 𝑑′ ≤ 3𝑇/4 2 3𝑇/4 < 𝑑′ ≤ 𝑇 1 
𝑇 > 𝑑′ 0 
 
B. Security Adaptive Ad-Hoc On-Demand Vector Routine 
Ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) is a routing 
protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. With RND algorithm it 
is now possible to identify the presence of wormholes in the 
network. Each node is assigned a ranked value. Whenever a 
route request is made from source to destination, the 
minimum security level (MSL) is checked with the assigned 
ranked values and transmit the message only to the trusted 
nodes. Refer to [7] for further reading. 
III. SPIN MODEL CHECKER OVERVIEW 
SPIN [3] is an automata-based temporal logic model 
checker. Its specification and modeling language is called 
PROMELA. In PROMELA, a system is modeled as the 
composition of asynchronous processes that can interact with 
buffered or unbuffered message channels. Since there is no 
notion of time or clock, models with real-time aspects are 
very hard, if not impossible, to express in PROMELA. The 
language is especially designed to describe systems such as 
asynchronous communication protocols. 
Correctness properties are specified in several ways in 
PROMELA. Assertions and never claims are the most 
frequently used constructs for this purpose. An assertion has 
a similar semantic as in the C Language. When the expression 
to be asserted is false, the assertion fails, and SPIN gives 
“assertion violated” error. 
Never claims are used to specify the finite or infinite 
behavior that should never happen during the execution of a 
system. When we want to specify a property to be satisfied by 
the system, we formalize it in a logic formula and produce a 
never claim that corresponds to the negation of this formula. 
SPIN then tries to find a violation for this never claim. If it 
finds one, this means there is a case that the opposite of our 
property can occur in the system, which means our property 
can not be satisfied by the system. A never claim can be 
written by hand or can be translated from a linear temporal 
logic (LTL) formula. SPIN also includes a timeline property 
editor that helps users visually specify properties that are 
otherwise hard to formalize. 
SPIN has two modes of operation: simulation and 
verification. In simulation mode, it runs the model and helps 
users get an impression on how their model behaves and 
debug their model. In verification mode, SPIN analyzes the 
model against the properties considering all possible 
executions performing an exhaustive search on the state 
space. It can also perform partial search on the state space, 
which is quite useful in case of very large models or 
insufficient computational resources. 
If SPIN finds a violation, it produces an error trace. Using 
this error trace, a user can run a simulation of the execution 
that leads to the violation. 
Our primary aim in this work is to find security flaws in the 
Figure 1Synchronous timing diagram for sender and receiver 
  
design of SAODV protocol. We employ SPIN to check our 
protocol model against the security properties that we 
formally specify as never claims in PROMELA and to list 
any security flaws, if any, as violations. 
IV. PROPOSED MODELING OF PROTOCOL SUITE 
A key task in modeling is abstracting various unnecessary 
details from specifications. Some assumptions of the models 
need to be considered as well. 
The nodes in our protocol suite are modeled using 
PROMELA process types. We start by modeling one source, 
one destination. Depending on the size of the network we fix 
the number of intermediate nodes for simplicity. Initially, we 
consider only a single attacker.  
 Broadcast communication among nodes are modeled by 
using PROMELA channels. In a network with 𝑁 nodes, each 
node is associated with 𝑁 − 1 unidirectional channels, and 
only the channels to its neighbors are used to send and receive 
messages. Separation of channels allows us to use channel 
assertions to reduce the size of the state space. The capacity 
of each channel is limited to two messages, which is enough 
for our modeling purposes. The neighborhood information is 
stored in a global connectivity matrix. Since the links are 
assumed to be bidirectional, the connectivity matrix is 
symmetric. When broadcasting, nodes refer this matrix to 
decide whether to send a message to a node or not. 
Two important properties are considered initially for 
routing operation: 
i) Correctness of distance information: We consider that 
if there is a route from a source to a destination, then 
the length of this path that is known to source is the 
shortest path between the two nodes. These properties 
can be specified by using temporal logic (LTL). 
ii) Loop freedom: Checking the absence of cycle among 
the nodes is another important property to be 
considered during model checking. We can say that if 
there is a path from source to a destination then the 
number of hops between them is at most 𝑛 − 1 if there 
are n nodes in a network. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this short paper we have proposed a formal verification 
approach to check the security, safety and other critical 
properties of a security protocol suite. SPIN model checker is 
to be used for the purpose of automated model checking. LTL 
formulas can model the safety and security properties which 
can be verified against the model of the protocol. SPIN can 
manage to reveal the flaws in the protocol specification in a 
couple of seconds or even in a sub-second time scale. 
Importantly, SPIN draws a counterexample identifying the 
exact state transitions that introduce flaws in the 
specification. 
We are very early stage of model checking the protocol 
suite. Apart from checking whether the neighbour 
discovering and routing of the protocol our future plan 
includes checking the security properties involving mobility 
and multiple attackers, causing secure routing a challenging 
task. In long term we plan to model check other similar 
routing protocols and draw a conclusive comparison among 
the protocols. 
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